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The financial crisis in 2008 is the greatest economic recession since the "Great 
Depression of the 1930s." The federal government has pumped $700 billion dollars into 
the financial market to save the biggest banks from collapsing. 1 Five years after the event, 
stock markets are hitting new highs and well-healed.2 Investors are cheering for the 
recovery of the United States economy.3 It is important to investigate the root causes of 
this failure of the capital markets. 
Many have observed that the sudden collapse of the United States housing market 
and the increasing number of unqualified subprime mortgages are the main cause of this 
economic failure. 4 Regulatory responses and reforms were requested right after the crisis 
occurred, as in previous market upheavals where we asked ourselves how better 
regulation could have stopped the market catastrophe and prevented the next one. 5 I argue 
that there is an inherent and systematic moral hazard in our financial systems, where 
excessive risk-taking has been consistently allowed and even to some extent incentivized. 
Until these moral hazards are eradicated or cured, our financial system will always face 
the risk of another financial crisis. 6 In this essay, I will discuss two systematic moral 
hazards, namely the incentive to take excessive risk and the incentive to underestimate 
risk. They are prevalent in our financial systems.7 More importantly, it is crucial to 
1 John B. Taylor, How Government Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2009 12:01 AM), 
http:/ /online. wsj .com/news/articles/SB 12341431 0280561945. 
2 THE Assoc. PRESS, S.&P. Hits New High as Market's Focus Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,2013, at B8. 
3 Johnathan Cheng, Stocks Hit New Highs, WALL ST. J. (April2, 2013 4:28PM), 
http:/ /online. wsj .com/news/articles/SB 10001424127887323296504578398053061816998. 
4 Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, INDIANA L. J., 215 (2013). 
5 Eilis Ferran, THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL F£NANCIAL CRISIS, 3-4 (Cambridge 
University Press) (2012). 
6 Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis, 29 CATO 1., 163 (2009). 
7 Sanjay Sanghoee, Greed and Punishment: Criminalize Moral Hazard to Fix Wall Street, HUFF POST (Jan. 
15, 2013 12:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sanjay-sanghoee/greed-and-punishment-wall-
street b 2459120.html. 
2 
understand what can be done in the current model to prevent the next financial turmoil 
from occurring. 8 
In Part I of this essay, I describe the relevant features of the financial crisis in 
2008 and the more recent "London Whale" scandal. In Part II, I describe the regulatory 
responses crafted after the economic failure as well as the executive compensation issue 
under the current system. In Part III, I discuss the incentive to take excessive risk and the 
incentive to underestimate risk system moral hazards in detail and how they have led us 
into financial turmoil. In Part IV, I endorse moral reform as a more sustainable solution 
to the moral hazard defect in our system. 
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN 2008 AND THE "LONDON WHALE" 
The financial crisis of 2008 commenced with the bursting of United States 
housing bubble that reached its apex in 2006.9 Securities and financial instruments 
closely related to United States real estate markets started to plummet since 2006. Soon 
after, the broader financial market collapsed and the credit market came to a liquidity 
halt. 1 0 The financial crisis was proximately triggered by flawed economic policies that 
encouraged home ownership among people who could not afford it without greater 
assistance than was given. Assistance included easy access to loans for subprime 
borrowers, enlargements of loan incentives with particularly favorable initial terms, 
8 Niko Lusiani, Accountability, Not Austerity, Can Help Prevent Next Financial Crisis, June 24, 2013, 
http://www.rightingfinance.org/?p=462. 
9 Shawn Tully, Welcome to the Dead Zone, CNN MONEY (May 5, 2006 12:14 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/03/news/economy/realestateguide_fortune/. 
10 Philip E. Strahan, Liquidity Risk and Credit in the Financial Crisis, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. POST, May 
14, 2012, http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2012/may/liguiditv-risk-
credit-financial-crisis/. 
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decreased fees for unwarranted loans band excessive confidence in rising real estate 
prices communicated to borrowers. 
The federal government has a long-standing desire to expand home ownership, 
particularly to low-income households. To facilitate this objective, government-
sponsored mortgage enterprises (GSE), such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were 
established in the 1930s and the 1970s. To that end, GSE bears the implicit backing of the 
government's full faith and credit. Since the early 1990s, in order to effectuate the goal of 
increasing home ownership, the government has imposed "affordable housing quotas" on 
GSE, which was encouraged and required to hold a huge portfolio of subprime 
mortgages. 11 This resulted in a lowering of mortgage underwriting standards and 
contributed significantly to the disarray of subprime mortgage market and the breakdown 
of the housing sector. 12 As banks gave out more loans to potential home owners, housing 
prices began to rise accordingly. 
Before the crisis, a steady and substantial influx of "hot" money from emerging 
markets flowed into American financial system. Coupled with the long-standing low 
interest rates set by the Federal Reserve, the ease and relative low cost of obtaining funds 
fueled the housing and credit bubble, building up consumers' debt burden. 13 As part of 
the housing and credit booms, the number of financial instruments, such as mortgage-
11 Daniel Mitchell, What to Do with Fannie and Freddie?, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2008), 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-mitchell-abromowitz16-
2008oct16,0,225574.story#axzz21FdWjN8P. 
12 Laurence Wilse-Samson, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Underwriting 
Standards, Loan Modifications and Securitization, 
http://www.columbia.edu/~lhw2110/Subprime survey Samson.pdf 
13 Lawrence H. White, Housing Finance and the 2008 Financial Crisis, CATO INST., August 2009, 
http :1 /www .downsizinggovernment.org/h ud/housing-finance-2008-financial-crisis 
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backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which based their 
value on mortgage payments and housing prices, significantly increased. 
As housing prices declined in 2007, major global financial institutions that had 
borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS and CDO reported significant losses. 
Traditionally, financial institutions profit from engaging in trading activities, which are 
heavily leveraged and requires short-term external financing. Banks proceed from 
matching lower-cost capital with higher-yielding investments. Therefore, the ability to 
acquire short-term financing is a lifeline for banks' operation. Unfortunately, in the case 
of Bear Stems, when the subprime mortgage meltdown started to surface, Bear was 
compelled to recognize significant losses on the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) held 
in its trading portfolio. The decline in the firm's collateral value prompted its lenders to 
require more liquid collaterals, instead of the illiquid collaterals it was used to, which, in 
tum, forced Bear to liquidate more MBS and pressure the portfolio's market value further. 
Consequently, due to the uncertainty concerned customers started to withdraw or close 
their accounts due to the uncertainty. This further reduced Bear's ability to sustain a 
business and eventually pushed the firm into insolvency. 
History repeats itself. As the memory of the financial crisis was slowly fading for 
many, four years after the financial crisis in 2008, it was reported that a rogue trader for 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. placed excessively heavy bets against positions held by other 
branches of the bank as well as other counter parties. A loss of $2 billion was initially 
reported by the firm for these trades. Subsequently, $5 billion additional losses were 
accounted in relation to the trades. A spokesman for the firm predicted total losses could 
5 
be in excess of $7 billion. 14 After the unveiling of the event, it was discovered that the 
trader has purposely concealed the losses when it was first discovered and corporate risk 
governance failed to discover the defect. 15 
II. REGULATORY RESPONSE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
In the wake of the crisis in 2008, the immediate question for policy makers was 
how to respond to the financial meltdown. The United States government responded to 
the crisis with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional 
bailouts. Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which 
implemented the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to provide the nation's failing 
financial institutions with a $700 billion emergency bailout. 
Following the massive scope of government bailouts, legal experts and law 
makers called for regulatory solutions aimed at mitigating the impact of the current crisis 
and preventing recurrences. 16 Regulators and legislators are considering actions regarding 
"lending practices, bankruptcy protection, tax policies, affordable housing, credit 
counseling, education, and the licensing and qualifications of lenders." 17 Addressing each 
of these topics, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) was signed into law by President Obama in July 2010. Dodd-Frank enhances 
authorities for the Federal Reserve to wind-down "too big to fail" institutions safely, 
safeguards taxpayers from financial institutions' losses by applying losses first to the 
14 Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New Fraud Inquiry as JPMorgan 's Loss Mounts, 
http:/ /dealbook.nytimes.com/20 12/07 113/jpmorgan-says-traders-obscured-losses-in-first -quarter/? r=O 
15 David Henry, Analysis: JPMorgan to be haunted by change in risk model, REUTERS (May 18,2012 
5:13PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/18/us-jpmorgan-risk-idUSBRE84Hl5120 120518 
16 JEC October Subprime Report, http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File id=l48eat7c-
ee62-42fD-b215-006db6alld65/Documents/Reports/10.25.070ctoberSubprimeReport.pdf 
17 Jd. 
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firm's investors and by including the creation of a pool funded by the largest financial 
institutions, requires stronger capital and liquidity positions for financial firms and related 
regulatory authorities, and exercises greater control over executive compensation. 18 
Among provisions in Dodd-Frank, the Volcker rule and the executive compensation 
provision have the most prominent effect on the financial system. 
A. Volcker Rule 
The Volcker Rule is a specific section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act originally devised to restrict American banks from making 
certain kinds of speculative investments which did not benefit their customers but played 
a key role in the financial crisis. 19 The rule prohibits banks from making investment bets 
with their own money.20 The rule also bans proprietary trading by commercial banks, 
whereby deposits are used to trade on the bank's own accounts. 21 Wall Street banks were 
blamed for accumulating an unwarranted amount of risk and unfair business practices due 
to the inability of regulators to oversee their complex financial instruments and activities 
properly. The Volcker rule aims to protect individuals by creating a more transparent 
financial regulation and oversight framework to prevent banks from gambling on their 
18 Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation, 
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/ AR2009061402443 pf.html 
19 David Cho and Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama's 'Volcker Rule' shifts power away from Geithner, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, February 13,2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/20 10/0 1121/AR201 00121 04935.html 
20 Scott Patterson and Deborah Solomon, Volcker Rule to Curb Bank Trading Proves Hard to Write, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10,2013 7:55PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424127887323838204579000623890621830 
21 Floyd Norris, Bank Rules That Serve Two Masters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,2011, at 81. 
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own account with money that taxpayers insure; consequently risks can be controlled with 
greater ease and visibility.22 
Advocates of the Volcker rule and Dodd-Frank generally praised them as 
milestones in legislation because their purpose is to mitigate the probability and scale of 
future financial panics, end taxpayer bailouts of Wall Street, and boost taxpayer 
protection.23 On the other hand, critics argued that the Volcker rule did not punish Wall 
Street enough for instigating the panic.24 More importantly, it was argued that "the rule 
amounted to a vast expansion of government control over the financial sector without 
addressing the real causes of the financial panic, ending too-big-to-fail or addressing the 
continuing public assistance to or moral hazards caused by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac."25 
Others also argued that the rule did not simplify American regulatory 
infrastructure or does not improve cross-border coordination, but instead created an even 
more complicated structure that is difficult to be compliant with and increased the risks of 
regulatory arbitrage and inefficiency. 26 In addition, the Volcker Rule is intended to 
regulate proprietary trading and exempt principal investments from regulation.27 In other 
words, the moral hazard within our financial system can still drive excessive risk-taking 
in principal investment, such as the toxic real estate investment the Lehman Brothers 
22 Jesse Eisinger, Volcker Rule Gets Murky Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (APR. 18,2012, 12:00 PM), 
http :I I dealbook.nytimes.com120 12104/181intemretation-of-vo lcker-rule-that-muddies-the-intent -of-
congress/? r=O. 
23 Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 16,2010, 
www. washingtonpost.corn/wpdynlcontentlarticlel20 10107 I 151 AR20 10071500464 _pf.html. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. 
26 Michael Helfer, Regulatory Reform Overview- What's Next?, at SIFMA Regulatory Reform Summit in 
New York City, July 15,2010. 
27 John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated 
and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV., 1073 (2012). 
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pursued in 2006 and 2007 before the crisis without propriety trading involved. 28 Yet, the 
Volcker rule is not going to regulate such activities. The simple alternative solution for 
the Volcker rule is to cure the moral hazard of excessive risk-taking. 
B. Executive Compensation 
Not until the advent of the global crisis, executive compensation incentives were 
largely overlooked by global regulatory schemes. 29 There is now an increasing 
recognition that the manner in which bank managers are compensated should be central 
to banking regulation, and to the oversight of the overall financial system. While ill-
designed compensation could lead to instability, excessive risk-taking, and gaming, the 
optimal response is not necessarily to swing to the other extreme and curb all risk-taking. 
A well-designed compensation contract should be multi-pronged rather than focused 
solely on bonus and equity. Along with deposit insurance premiums that are sensitive to 
bank executives' incentives, executive pay package could help achieve more effective 
banking regulation-one that does the best job of guaranteeing the stability of the banking 
system. 
Many have accused excessive risk-takings by bank executives of facilitating the 
crisis. 30 The public was outraged by the size of the pay packages of executives at failed 
financial institutions. For instance, much attention has been directed to the large bonuses 
for Merrill Lynch former CEO, John Thain at the time Bank of America assumed control 
of Merrill. Thain was identified of earning a total compensation of$83,785,021, which 
28 /d. at 1074. 
29 Michael Faulkender, Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and 
Proposed Reforms, 22 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 107. 
30 Victoria McGrane, Bernanke: Regulators Have Taken Steps to Limit Excessive Risk Taking., 
http://blogs. wsj .com/economics/20 13/11/08/bemanke-regulators-have-taken-steps-to-limit-excessive-risk-
taking/. 
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included a base salary of $750,000, a cash bonus of $15,000,000, stock grants of 
$33,013,151, and options grants of$35,017,421.31 In terms of compensation structure, 
Thain, like many other executives, received pay in the form of equity or options. To the 
extent the shareholders of levered institutions benefit from granting executives stock or 
options and aligning them with shareholders they also may suffer from the unintended 
could have the unintended encouragement of executives to take on additional risks.32 
Aside from the ill-structured executive compensation plans, the predatory lending 
practice many banks, including Countrywide Financial, were involved also greatly 
contributed to the financial system failure. Predatory lending is the deceptive, or 
fraudulent practices of mortgage lenders during the loan origination process, where unfair 
and abusive loan terms are imposed on borrowers.33 Predatory lending typically involves 
borrowings backed by collaterals. Mortgage originators were accused of tricking 
borrowers into believing that the borrower's ability to pay is greater than it actually is. 
Once the borrower defaults on the loan as mortgage originators have already projected, 
the lender can recuperate or foreclose the collateral and profit from the sale of the 
collateral. 34 
A well-designed executive compensation package can serve as a key mechanism 
for corporate governance, which could align executives' investment and financing 
31 Michael Kitchen, Merrill's Thain was highest-paid CEO in 2007, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/merrili-Iynchs-thain-tops-ceo-pay-ranking-for-2007-report. 
32 Michael Faulkender, Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and 
Proposed Reforms, 22 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 107. 
33 Office of Inspector General, Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related to Predatory Lending, Report No. 06-
011, June 2006. 
34 Mike Hudson and E. Scott Reckard, Workers Say Lender Ran 'Boiler Rooms', L.A. Times, February 4, 
2005, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ameriquest4feb0405,1,5202756.story#axzz21FdWjN8P. 
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decision making with shareholder interests?5 However, a flawed compensation scheme 
can lead to value destruction and excessive risk taking. 36 If executive compensation is 
tied to the company's short-term profits, it can lead can lead executives to pass over 
promising long-term investment opportunities in order to focus on short-term profit 
taking, which in tum boosts their short-term compensation. In addition, if public 
companies are over-valued by the financial market, compensation in the form of stock 
options may lead executive to focus on short-term earnings or, in some extreme cases, to 
manipulate earnings to justify the firm's current stock price, or sustain their 
compensation based on the stock price.37 
In response to the crisis and public outcry, executive compensation has been a 
prominent target of regulators and policy makers of various financial markets. The 
United Kingdom Financial Services Authority now regulates both the structure of 
executive pay and the claw-back time period during which the incentive pay is 
distributed.38 
In the United States, the SEC and the Federal Reserve have imposed "quantitative 
limits on the amount, structure, and timing of compensation payments to top-paid 
executives at companies receiving TARP funds. 39 Further expansion of pay control was 
contemplated as a part of Dodd-Frank. Particularly, Dodd-Frank regulates that "within 
35 Michael Faulkender, Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and 
Proposed Reforms, 22 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 108. 
36 Ben Bemanke, Financial Regulation and Supervision after the Crisis: The Role of the Federal Reserve, 
October 23, 2009, http://www. federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlbernanke20091 023a.htm. 
37 Michael Faulkender, Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and 
Proposed Reforms, 22 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 108. 
38 Jill Treanor, Financial Services Authority vets banks' pay policies, 
http://www. theguardian.com/business/2009/ dec/ 13/banking-executive-pay-tax. 
39 Aaron Lucchetti, David Enrich and Joann S. Lublin, Fed Hits Banks With Sweeping Pay Limits, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 23,2009 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125623026446601619. 
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one year of enactment, the SEC must issue rules that direct the national securities 
exchanges and associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is not in 
compliance with the requirements of the compensation sections."40 Dodd-Frank's 
executive compensation provision also requires a public corporation to submit executive 
compensation to a shareholder vote at least once every three years. 41 
More prominently, under the provision, shareholders must be apprised of the 
relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance 
of the company.42 The annual total compensation of the chief executive officer, or any 
equivalent position and the ratio of the amount of the medium of the annual total with the 
total CEO compensation must be disclosed to shareholders. 43 In addition, to ensure 
fairness, members of the Board of Director's Compensation Committee shall be an 
independent member of the board of directors, a compensation consultant or legal council, 
as provided by rules issued by the SEC.44 
However, some argued that Dodd-Frank will contribute to legal uncertainties in 
the financial sector at least in the short-term.45 The Act creates a generic framework, 
where many key issues to be resolved by implementing regulations are left out. 
According to Guynn, at least 243 new federal rule-makings are needed to implement its 
40 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Enrolled Final Version- HR 4173), § 
153(d) THOMAS, October 20, 2013. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. 
43 Jd. 
44 H.R. 4173, § 951; amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq.) by inserting: 
SEC. 10C. Compensation Committees. 
45 The Uncertainty Principle, WALL ST. J. (July 14,2010 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052748704288204575363162664835780. 
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provisions.46 In the next phase of United States financial regulatory reform, Guynn 
argued that "regulators will face an intense period of rule-making for at least 18 months, 
and market participants will need to make strategic decisions in an environment of 
regulatory uncertainty. The legislation is complicated and contains substantial 
ambiguities, many of which will not be resolved until regulations are adopted, and even 
then, many questions are likely to persist that will require consultation with the staff of 
the various agencies involved."47 
The Dodd-Frank will not alter the fundamental shapes of the United States 
financial regulatory regime and it simply re-shuffles the alignment of the regulatory 
boxes.48 The United States financial regulatory structure will remain the same and the 
regulatory reform effort might not be promising as it seems.49 
III. DEFICIENCIES IN THE REGULATORY REFORM AND PROPOSED 
REGULATORY SOLUTION 
Thus far, I have provided an overview of the financial crisis and regulatory 
responses afterwards. In this section, I will discuss in detail the deficiencies observed in 
the current regulatory reform and argue that the regulatory reform, such as Dodd-Frank, 
is inadequate and more involved reform is needed. 50 
A. Inadequacy of Government Oversight 
46 Randall D. Guynn, The Financial Panic of2008 and Financial Regulatory Reform, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/20 1 0/11/20/the-financial-panic-of-2008-and-financial-regulatory-
reform/. 
47 !d. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. 
50 Gretchen Morgenson, 3,000 Pages of Financial Reform, but Still Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 20 I 0, 
atBUI. 
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Under Dodd-Frank, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System would 
be "responsible for overall conditions of financial market stability. "51 Such responsibility 
is conducted via the collection of information, permitting the Board to evaluate "the risks 
present in the overall financial system. "52 Yet the regulation does not allow the Fed to 
intrude into the operations of individual firms but rather will emphasize systemic risks 
affecting the market as a whole. 53 
Additionally, it is argued that the creation of new regulators will not bring greater 
transparency or accountability to the regulatory process. The reform merges the Office of 
Thrift Supervision with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the SEC with 
the CFTC. Disagreements between the two agencies will be refereed to the Financial 
Services Oversight Council, which would likely lead to slower decision-making. More 
importantly, the regulation reform fails to address the "too big to fail" issue. The largest 
banks of the nation are still intact with a huge concentration of capital and financial risks. 
The Consumer Financial Protection Agency protects users and borrowers in the 
credit card and mortgage business. 54 Yet, the agency was not delegated the proper 
authority to regulate the mutual fund, hedge fund and private equity industries, which 
would also expose consumers to a great amount of financial risks. Therefore, we should 
51 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (2008) at 
144. 
52 !d. 
53 !d. 
54 Jean Eaglesham, Warning Shot On Financial Protection, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2011 12:0 l AM), 
http://online.wsj .com/news/articles/SB 10001424052748703507804576130370862263258. 
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look beyond the traditional shape of regulatory reform to prevent the next crisis from 
occurring. 55 
B. Proposed Regulatory Reform 
Market participants advocate two forms of regulatory reforms. 56 First, minimum 
investment or co-investment should be required from asset managers. Before any 
investments are made, asset managers should contribute to a significant portion of the 
deal before investors' money is accepted. Second, we should impose legal, or in some 
cases criminal, sanctions against the primary decision-maker. The standard should be the 
"best practice" standard, which will encourage the corporate managers' to exercise their 
best judgment using information they possess at the moment of decision-making. 
Circling back to the first recommended approach, if the asset manager bears the 
same amount of financial risk as the investors, he/she will conduct a higher level of due 
diligence and a greater level of risk management for his/her decision-making. The 
minimum investment threshold will offset the tendency to take excessive risk by 
counterbalancing moral hazard. 57 
I would defer to the legislature for the precise context of the minimum investment 
threshold. Assuming that every investor and every investment opportunity is different in 
nature, the design of appropriate incentive schemes requires a case-by-case analysis. 
However, we do not want to trump the nature of capitalism and free market by imposing 
55 Ross Levine, Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis, Bank of International Settlement, 
http://www. bis.org/ events/ confl 00624/levinepaper. pdf. 
56 Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV., 185 (2009). 
57 Ruth Sullivan, Impetus for managers to invest in own funds, FIN. TIM ES (Jan. 9, 2011 9:06AM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/19d 17382-1 a96-lle0-b 1 00-00144feab49a.html#axzz213waOWKd. 
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rigid and tedious market regulations. The proposed regulation should eliminate the 
current incentive schemes giving asset managers an "upside only" perspective. 
Some scholars also argued that the right approach for market reform is to provide 
market participants and consumers with adequate information to make sounds personal 
investment decisions. The suggested approach would require designated persons like the 
key decision-makers at banks, hedge funds, and other financial institutions to file a 
financial disclosure statement that reveals their stakes in their risk-taking decisions and 
how they may profit from them. 
Legal and criminal sanctions are also argued to be a solution. Financial penalties 
for banks are no longer novelties. JPMorgan recently paid a hefty $13 billion penalty to 
settle with the United States government over Mortgage Backed Securities related legal 
disputes. 58 Since the beginning of2010, Bank of America has paid about $45.87 billion 
in various settlement agreements. 59 For companies, severe financial sanctions might not 
always be feasible, since that would often result in significant job losses for lower-level 
workers who are not involved with high-level decision making. 
As other criminal cases, to impose any criminal liabilities, the government must 
prove beyond a reasonable double the criminal intent. In the scenario of white collar 
crime, this is sometimes a difficult standard to meet. The recent collapse of MF Global is 
a good example of just how hard it will be to prove criminal violations. Former MF 
Global CEO Jon Corzine asked the United States District Court in Manhattan to dismiss 
58 Tom Schoenberg, Dawn Kopecki, Hugh Son & Dakin Campbell, JPMorgan Said to Reach Record $13 
Billion U.S. Settlement, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20,2013 1:27AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-
19/jpmorgan-said-to-have-reached-13-billion-u-s-accord.html. 
59 Bank of America 's Settlement Tally, WALL ST. 1. (May 6, 2013 2:46PM), 
http:/ /b logs. wsj .com/moneybeat/20 13/05/06/bank-of-americas-settlement-tally-an-update/. 
16 
regulators' charges related to more than $1 billion in customer money that went missing 
as the firm spiraled toward bankruptcy. He claimed that "there is no evidence 
demonstrating that Mr. Corzine knowingly directed unlawful conduct or acted without 
good faith. "60 Although, the district court dismissed this claim by stating that 
"Defendants' contentions would suggest that ... perhaps the debacle must have been 
the fateful work of supernatural forces, or else that the explanation for a spectacular 
multi-billion dollar crash of a global corporate giant is simply that 'stuff happens."', 
it's interesting to see what happens in the appellate court.61 
Recently, there have also been more criminal prosecutions for violations of the 
antifraud laws. In US. v Rajaratnam, hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam was found 
guilty on all 14 counts of conspiracy and securities fraud and sentenced to 11 years in 
prison.62 Although the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the United States Sentencing 
Commission to review sentencing guidelines for financial crimes to ensure they reflect 
the impact of the offenses. 63 Higher recommended sentences may result in greater 
punishments because the sentencing guidelines are not mandatory and judges have the 
liberty to deviate from the guideline in the sentencing, perhaps the recommended 
guideline may be used as a floor in severe cases. 
However, without a significant shift in how our financial market works, mere 
regulations will not cure the systemic defects and moral hazards already deeply rooted in 
6
° Corzine sued by CFTC over MF Global debacle, http://money.cnn.com/20 13/06/27 /investing/mf-global-
corzine/ 
61 Banks fail to win dismissal of MF Global lawsuit, http://www.reuters.com/article/20 13/111 12/us-
mfglobal-lawsuit-idUSBRE9AB 1 OL20131112 
62 U.S. v Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. Oct. 25 , 2012). 
63 David Debold and Matthew Benjamin, 
uLosing Ground"- In Search of a Remedy for the Overemphasis on Loss and Other Culpability Factors 
in the Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud and Theft, 160 U.PA.L.REV., 142 (2011). 
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our system. Today, many financial executives escaped criminal liability even though their 
irresponsible decisions driven by greed and self-interest almost brought the financial 
system to the ground. Some traders lost their original posts. But they were awarded 
millions of dollars as their severance package, which an ordinary citizen could not make 
in his or her life time of working. As long as this compensation practice is not rectified, 
executives will continue taking the risky bets and put the system at risk. 
The responsibility of protecting investors also falls on the trustees of the company. 
In a more recent case, New York State Supreme Court is close to struck a settlement deal 
between Bank of America and 22 mortgage securities investors, which will resolve Bank 
of America's legal liability for the one million loans made by Countrywide Financial and 
inherited by Bank of America.64 The essence of this settlement goes to Bank ofNew 
York Mellon's role as the trustee charged with protecting all investors in the securities 
sold by Countrywide. 65 The result of this case will re-emphasize the duty trustees owe to 
asset-backed securities. 
IV. SYSTEMIC MORAL HAZARD IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Moral hazard occurs when one party is responsible for the interests of another, yet 
has a conflicting incentive to prioritize his or her own interests above others. 66 Such 
moral hazards are pervasive in the financial system. Notably, the most prevalent forms of 
moral hazard is an incentive to take excessive risk or an incentive to understate the risk 
inherent in the transaction under consideration. 
64 Gretchen Morgenson, Who Has Your Back? Hard to Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2013, at BUt. 
65 !d. 
66 Dowd, supra note 6, at 14 7. 
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A. Incentive to Take Excessive Risk 
Moral hazard arises when asset managers are not financially responsible for all of 
the consequences of their actions. Since in practice are no financial penalties are imposed 
for asset managers' wrongful investment managers' decisions and higher returns are 
generally associated with higher risks taken, asset managers have the incentive to take 
additional risk for additional returns. 
This form of investor-asset manager relationship is inherent in the modem-day 
financial system. All the failed financial institutions, such as Lehman and Merrill Lynch 
share this type of relationship. For instance, Lehman Brothers accumulated excessively 
risky Collateral Debt Obligations (CDO) assets right before the collapse in 2008, where it 
clearly ignored various market signs of a potential housing market downturns. This 
outrageous behavior is driven by record high bonuses awarded to banking and investment 
banking executives in the years leading to the great burst. 
Fee arrangements between investors and asset managers are frequently consisted 
of a fixed fee and a performance fee. The existence of a performance fee balances the 
equation. If a manager earns a fee based on assets under management, part of the value of 
the asset management relationship can be seen as the annuity that comes from the stream 
of fixed management fees. 67 A loss of capital reduces that performance income stream 
and therefore reduces the value of the annuity.68 
The loss of the performance income can counterbalance the additional value that 
comes from taking greater risk. Likewise, investors may insist that managers place a 
67 William N. Goetzmann, Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. & Stephen A. Ross, High-Water 
Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts, 58 J. FIN. 1685, 1686 (2003). 
68 /d. 
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significant amount of personal capital at risk in the same pool as the client's. However, in 
order for this theory to work, the rewards of increased risk-taking cannot significantly 
outweigh the costs, as happened in the years preceding the crash. 
John C. Coffee also argued that incentive-based compensation at financial 
institutions focused on short-term results instead of longer-term risks is one of the 
systemic moral hazards prevalent in our system. 69 Executives in charge of many decision-
makings at the "too big to fail" financial institution are rewarded generously in their 
annual bonus if they close a sufficient number of deals for the given year. However, the 
financial consequence of the deal won't be apparent until years later when these 
executives who made the initial decisions and reaped the generous bonus have either left 
the institution or moved on to "too big to fail" institutions.70 In short, excessive executive 
compensation leads to excessive risk-taking, and eventually leads to a systemic moral 
hazard. 
B. Incentive to Understate Risk 
Wall Street tends to undervalue or deliberately conceal the risks associated with 
prospective transactions. In the case of the "London Whale," early indicators of potential 
risky bets and losses were clear. A cross line of business (LOB) governance monitoring 
function should have detected this defect quickly. Arguably the monitoring was 
overridden. 
The tendency to understate risks was also demonstrated in the market for 
mortgage-related assets. Mortgage bank officers performing mortgage origination are 
69 Coffee, supra note 27, at 1047. 
70 !d. 
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compensated based on the volume of mortgages they produce. The more mortgages they 
originate, the higher the compensation they receive. Neither the mortgage bank, such as 
Countrywide Financial, nor any of its agents has any incentive to be concerned with the 
quality of the loans they originate so long as they can package and resell these mortgage 
loans into mortgage pools. Pool sponsors-investment firms whose business it is to 
structure investment pools, securitize them, and sell the resulting tranches of securities to 
investors-were focused on closing transactions. 71 
Faith in the market's ability to analyze and measure risk was firmly held by many 
key contributors to the financial crisis. They had much to gain by taking credit risk and 
by erring on the side of understating the risks taken, betting on the other party's resources 
in exchange for potential lucrative personal gains. The bet was permitted to grow as risk 
control shriveled, thus learning only a fac;ade of control over a disintegrated infrastructure. 
Downplaying mounting risk led us to the financial demise of the entire mortgage lending 
system. 
V. PREVENTION OF THE NEXT FINANCIAL TURMOIL 
So far, we have examined regulatory reforms after the crisis, and investigated the 
two inherent systemic moral hazards in our financial systems. Yet, the problem must be 
addressed by more ethical thinking and greater respect for virtues and intangible capital 
assets such as reputation and social capital. We need the yet-to-come moral reform that 
integrates the dehumanized world of finance and economics with the virtues of human 
good. Reexamining the financial crisis, we could easily identify a series of moral 
malfeasances, which includes lenders originating unqualified loans, homebuyers 
71 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REv., 214 (2009). 
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falsifying data on their mortgage application frequently at the prompt of mortgage 
originators, lenders misleading investors for the mortgage backed securities sold, and 
bankers creating complicated financial products designed to hide the true risks inherent in 
these instruments. 
Dealing with the crisis, we turned to economists for economic policy deficiencies, 
mathematicians for financial model insufficiencies, law makers and legal experts for 
regulatory reforms. Yet as examined above, these experts cannot by themselves provide a 
sufficient solution to prevent the next crisis. Instead, we should seek intangible 
alternatives such as trust, honor, dignity, virtue, and the common good and emphasize 
their practical and moral important in re-establishing trust in the financial system. 
A. Moral Virtue 
Honesty and transparency are the centerpiece of moral virtue. 72 A bank can 
provide information in an honest and transparent fashion so that the stakeholders 
involved can easily obtain a good insight into the issues that are relevant for them. 
Transparency contributes to the trading party's decision-making by allowing them the 
fullest extent of information available. A lack of transparency enables the better-informed 
market party to exploit the other party's lack of information "by manipulating the price, 
quality or quantity in a manner that is hard to discern for the less well-informed market 
party."73 
There is also the virtue of taking due care of the interests of clients. Clients' 
information should not be sold and used in other ways from the way it was initially 
72 Johan J. Graafland and Bert W. van de Ven, The Credit Crisis and the Moral Responsibility of 
Professionals in Finance, 103 J. OF Bus. En-nes, 605-619 (20 11 ). 
73 /d. at 623. 
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intended to be used. Banks should be responsible to ensure the client understands the 
nature and consequences of the contract she or he entered into. So something was indeed 
wrong with the behavior of many brokers, but this was not so much the intention to 
deceive clients as the lack of due care for their interests. Lack of due care for the interests 
of consumers was prevalent during the financial crisis. Mortgages originated by the banks 
and later sold to investors were mislabeled as to their quality. Consequently, investors 
were misinformed. 
B. Human Dignity 
The idea of human dignity encompasses the intrinsic worth inherent in all human 
beings. Human dignity forms the conceptual core of human rights and individuals are 
considered as intrinsically connected to the rest of society. The lack of respect for human 
dignity has led to many unethical business behaviors during the financial crisis. For 
example, "predatory lending" is the term used to describe the unfair, deceptive, or 
fraudulent practices imposed during the loan origination process. Unfair and abusive loan 
terms were routinely imposed on borrowers. The threat to human dignity associated with 
the financial crisis in consumer business transactions reveal the necessity for nurturing a 
greater awareness of moral consciences. 
C. The Common Good 
Common good is the good we have in common, under which the pursuit of human 
fulfillment, flourishing, and perfection by all in society. 74 It is the collection of 
collaborative efforts where society helps every member within it achieve each one's 
74 Dowd, supra note 6, at 149. 
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individual objective. Many unscrupulous behaviors during the financial crisis were 
contrary to the common good. For instance, executives took excessive risks for personal 
pecuniary gains at the expense of other taxpayers in the society. 
CONCLUSION 
As it is still fresh in memory, the economic scandals provide a unique opportunity 
for us to review and look back at the moral standards for market participants. As 
illustrated in this paper, the financial crisis was not an isolated event. It was triggered by 
years of distorted macroeconomic policies, faulty executive compensation structures, 
inadequate regulatory oversight and more importantly the inherent moral hazards- the 
incentive to take excessive risks and the incentive to understate risks, long existed in our 
financial systems. 
Various measurements have been adopted since 2008 to contain the risks and 
prevent the next scandal from happening. Dodd-Frank was implemented to regulate 
lending practices, bankruptcy protection, tax policies, affordable housing, credit 
counseling, education, and the licensing and qualifications of lenders. 
Yet, as illustrated, there are two main deficiencies within the Volcker rule and the 
executive compensation provision. The Volcker Rule is a vast expansion of government 
control over the financial sector without addressing the real causes of the financial panic. 
The rule also complicates American regulatory infrastructure or but does not improve 
cross-border coordination. The Volcker Rule and the executive compensation provision 
still does not remediate the incentive issue of excessive risk taking. 
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Therefore, to restore the trust society places in this sector of the economy and to 
reassert moral authority in the financial community and in consumer business transaction, 
we need to search beyond the regulatory arena for a solution. It is time for us to focus on 
the reputational capital and social capital at stake. Reputational and social capital are 
facilitated by refining our moral virtues, human dignity, and the common good. As the 
financial market is ever-changing, we will always be drafting statutes to deal with issues 
occurred. These statutes and regulations are hardly sufficient to prevent the next sin. 
Increasing the stock of reputational and social capital, however, is more efficient 
and sustainable than legal and regulatory intervention. The moral reform will stay with 
society and not become obsolete or outdated. The moral reform will cure the failure of 
social responsibility, not only in the financial sector, but in the society as a whole. To this 
end, honesty and transparency are of crucial importance. 
Banks ought to furnish accurate and transparent information to customers for their 
decision making. Due care of clients' interests should also be paid much attention. Banks 
should be responsible to ensure the client understands the nature and consequences of the 
contract she or he entered into. In addition, to nurture a greater awareness of moral 
consciences, human dignity associated with the financial crisis in consumer business 
transactions must be emphasized. Ultimately, the common good should be pursued using 
collaborative efforts where society helps every member within it achieve each one's 
individual objective for fulfillment, flourishing, and perfection by all in the society. 
We should never forget about the moral degradation leading to the financial crisis, 
which abused the societal trust inherent in our interdependence and mutual 
responsibilities. To rebuild and restore the trust society delegates in the financial sector, it 
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must emphasize the ethics of virtue, human dignity, and the philosophy of the common 
good. 
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